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Was the Asia crisis caused by the build up of
vulnerabilities in the real economy, with panicky
investor pullout as merely the trigger or messenger
of a necessary market correction? Or was it caused
largely by the normal workings of under-regulated
national and international financial markets, the
panicky pullout itself being a prime cause? The
short answer is, some of both. The article describes
the double helix-like interaction of real and finan-
cial causes. It then outlines a strategy of escape
from crisis, including the reintroduction of capital
controls and creation of an Asia Fund.
Explanations are about the only thing not in short
supply in the Asian crisis. It would be entertaining
to plot them on a matrix, with 'actors' on one axis
and 'actions' on the other. Even a small sampling
has to include:
the governments of the crisis-affected countries,
individually and collectively (corruption, collu-
sion, nepotism, distorted markets, insufficient
democracy, excessive democracy, 'crony capital-
ism', fixed exchange rate regime, implicit gov-
ernment guarantees to banks and big
companies in their foreign borrowing, prema-
ture capital-account liberalisation, lack of
regional cooperation)
foreign banks (sloppy credit-risk analysis,
excessive confidence in currency pegs, moral
hazard behaviour, Panglossian values, panic)
domestic banks (ditto)
investors, domestic and foreign (ditto)
domestic firms (ditto, plus occult accounting,
family control)
the IMF (pressure for premature financial
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liberalisation, moral hazard, bail-out
conditionality of excessïve austerity and
excessive emphasis on structural reforms
the US Treasury ( pressure for premature
financial liberalisation, insufficient contribution
to bail-out funds)
the Japanese government (insufficient demand
stimulus at home, insufficient contribution to
bail-out funds abroad)
the Japanese economy (two-thirds of the Asian
economy, in seventh year of stagnation and
getting worse)
'globalisation', with its free floating
responsibility
This rich diversity reflects, in part, participants'
attempts to shift the blame. The main external
actors (the IMP and the US Treasury) blame
national actors, governments blame outsiders, and
national populations blame everyone but them-
selves. lt also reflects the fact that there is not one
Asian crisis, but several countries with different
kinds of troubles and backgrounds to which
different explanations may apply
Beyond this, the diversity reflects deeper differences
in beliefs about rationality and markets. Those
whose wider worldview emphasises rationality, self-
adjusting markets, and market failure as excep-
tional, except when governments introduce
distortions, see the Asia crisis as the result of ratio-
nal calculations by rational actors in a situation of
market-distorting government interventions. Those
whose worldview stresses non-rationality (or a dif-
ferent kind of rationality than that assumed by neo-
classical theory), routine failure of well-working
markets, and the need for government interven-
tions to modify market outcomes see the crisis as
the result of non-rational calculations in under-
regulated markets.
The debate about the causes has been less a
debate than paradigms ('parrot-times') talking
past each other. Some hard testing is needed. The
problem is that even in one country several dif-
ferent explanations may contain truth and rein-
force each other. But even allowing for country
2 Quoted in Michael Lipton, 'The East Asian crises, Conference, Institute of Development Studies, Sussex
banking, and the poor', paper for East Asian Crisis University, 13-14 July 1998.
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and time differences, 'There are not eighteen good
reasons for anything', as George Stigler once said!
This article aims, modestly, not at the necessary
hypothesis formulation and testing, but at an
interpretative account. It gives prominence to the
non-rational elements as an offset to the tendency
of economists to be much more accepting of sto-
ries based on the assumption of rational calcula-
tion, simply because they are more congruent
with neoclassical theory And unlike other
accounts, it encompasses both the crisis and the
prolonged prior success.
1 Scale of the Crisis
Table 1 shows the change in exchange rates and
stock prices in East and Southeast Asia between
June 1997 and late March 1998. The three coun-
tries identified as the worst affected - South Korea,
Thailand, Indonesia - have had the biggest falls in
exchange rates, ranging from 36 per cent to 72 per
cent. However, Malaysia and the Philippines, gen-
erally regarded as having escaped lightly, have had
exchange rate declines of not much less than
Thailand and Korea. Adding the fall in the stock
market to the fall in the exchange rate to get a
broader measure of impact, we have to put Malaysia
with the group of worst affected countries, with the
Philippines just behind. In short, the conventional
understanding that only Korea, Thailand and
Indonesia have been badly affected is not true by
these measuresMalaysia and the Philippines have
been hurt almost as much. Even Japan, Hong Kong
and Singapore have taken substantial hits. Taiwan
and China look to be least affected.
As of July 1998 it is clear that, except perhaps in the
case of Korea, the crisis is not yet in the clearing-up-
after-the-storm stage; not a 'V' nor a 'U' but an 'E or
an 'S'. After a respite in early 1998, a second great
wave of capital outflow occurred in May and June,
and forecasters resumed chasing the economies
downhill. A report in the South China Morning Post
began, 'A cocktail of negative factors is fast
unravelling Asian stock markets' first-quarter gains
and more losses may be in store as further evidence
emerges about the parlous condition of the region's
Table 1: Change in exchange rates and stock prices in Asia (% between 2 June
1997 and 24 March 1998)
economies'3. It is not an exaggeration to liken the
Asian crisis to the Great Depression of the 1930s in
terms of the scale of the falls in output and con-
sumption and the increase in poverty and insecu-
rity Countries have been pushed back down the
hierarchy of world income to where they were 10
years ago and more.4 Meanwhile the international
lenders have escaped with small losses, disproving
once again the adage, 'If you owe the bank $1 mil-
lion you have a problem, if you owe the bank $1
billion the bank has a problem'.
2 The High Debt-Debt Deflation
Story
Most commentators agree that the sharp pullout of
funds by investors across the region was the trigger,
and that the pullout was panicky The whipsaw
movement from capital inflows to capital outflows
was on a scale that could not but tear apart the social
fabric of countries subjected to it, especially where
political structures are only weakly, institutionalised.
Net private flows to or from the five Asian economies
(the ASEAN four plus South Korea) were plus $93
billion in 1996, turning to minus $12 billion in
Jake Lloyd-Smith, 'Asia hunkers down for bumpy
journey', South China Morning Post, 7 May 1998.
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1997. The swing in one year of $105 billion (with
most of the outflow concentrated in the last quarter
of 1997) equals 11 per cent of the combined GD? of
the five countries. Asia's experience was worse even
than Latin America's in the 1980s. The swing
between 1981 inflows and 1982 outflows in the
three biggest debtors (Brazil, Mexico, Argentina)
amounted to 8 per cent of their combined GD?
An interpretative account has to explain why the
inflows were so big, why the outflows were so big,
and why the contraction of economic activity has
continued to be so sharp. lt has to link the banking
crisis, the currency crisis and the corporate crisis,
and the politics with the economics, without
becoming so luxuriant as to be obscure.
2.1 The bank-based high debt model
Thanks to relatively equal income distribution the
large majority of Asian households are net savers (in
contrast to Latin America). They deposit much of
their savings in banks. Banks have to lend. But not
to households and not to governments, which are
not sizeable net borrowers. Banks have lent largely
to firms seeking to borrow in order to invest.
Per capita income measured at current exchange rates.
EAST ASIA
Exchange rate
against US$
Stock index Total
Japan 11 17 28
China 0.2 11 11
South Korea 36 34 70
Hong Kong 0.1 22 22
Taiwan 15 10 5
SOUTHEAST ASIA
Exchange rate
against US$
Stock index Total
Thailand 36 17 53
Malaysia 31 34 65
Indonesia 72 24 96
Singapore 11 20 31
Large Asian firms have tended to finance a large
proportion of their investment from bank borrow-
ings, and to carry a large amount of debt relative to
equity, compared to Western or Latin American
firms. High debtlequity ratios allowed them to
invest much more than through retained earnings
or equity finance alone, and high corporate invest-
ment helped to propel the region's fast economic
development over several decades. Corporate sec-
tors with high levels of debt are vulnerable to
shocks that cause a fall in cashflow or an increase in
fixed payment obligationssystemic shocks such as
a fall in aggregate demand, a rise in interest rates, or
devaluation of the currency (when part of the debt
is foreign).6
This bank-based system of financial intermediation
encourages close relations between bankers and
corporate managers, and is sometimes called 'rela-
tionship' banking. The system often includes gov-
ernment incentives to lend to particular sectors or
functions. And it includes, importantly, a closed or
partially closed capital account, such that financial
capital cannot move freely in and out of the coun-
try. Local citizens and foreign residents are not per-
mitted to hold accounts with commercial banks
abroad, banks are not allowed to extend loans in
foreign currencies in the domestic market, non-
bank private corporations are not allowed to bor-
row abroad, foreigners can not own shares listed by
national companies on domestic stock markets,
national companies can not sell securities on inter-
national stock and bond markets, foreign banks are
restricted in the domestic market. This apparatus
buffers highly leveraged corporate sectors from
See Wade and Veneroso, op.cit. for discussion of the
problems of the empirical evidence on debt/equity
ratios. Among other problems, the evidence I have seen
includes only long-term debt, and in the case of
conglomerates it does not properly consolidate debt so
as to account for the practice of one affiliate borrowing
to buy quasi-equity in another affiliate, thereby
spuriously lowering the second one's debt/equity ratio.
Evidence on the size of bank intermediation suggests
that the ratio of credit to GDP in Asia in 1990-96
ranged from 207 per cent in Japan down to 114 per cent
in Singapore (with Hong Kong, Thailand, Malaysia, and
Korea in between, but Indonesia and Philippines around
63-65 per cent). Colombia, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina
ranged from 42 per cent to 18 per cent, with Chile at 70
per cent. The US figure was 58 per cent. Source is
Goldman Sachs, elaborated in Michael Pomerleano, 'The
East Asian crisis and corporate finances: a micro story',
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systemic shocks and from the prudential limits of
Western banks, allowing them to sustain levels of
investment well above what the risk preferences of
equity holders would allow. Very high domestic
savings permit the investment to be financed
domestically
At its most fully developed the bank-based high
debt model becomes the developmental state. The
developmental state was most fully developed in
Japan (1955-73), Korea (1961-95), and Taiwan
(1955continuing).7 Amidst the current talk of the
death throes of Asian crony capitalism it is worth
recalling that Japan, Korea and Taiwan are the most
successful non-city-state developing countries since
the Second World War. No other countries have
achieved such big gains in the average real wage or
the average real wage of the bottom 25 per cent. No
other countries have risen so far in their technolog-
ical capacity . Japan takes out more patents in the
US than any other country bar the US itself. In
recent years, Taiwan has taken out the 6th largest
number, Korea the 7th largest, ahead of the middle-
ranking OECD countries like Italy, Ireland,
Netherlands, Scandanavia.8 No other developing
countries come even close. (But the environmental
costs of the model have been very high.) Singapore
and Malaysia are closest to developmental states in
Southeast Asia, Indonesia is the furthest.
2.2 Financial liberalisation
Asian governments, encouraged by the IMF and the
World Bank as well as by national business elites,
liberalised their financial systems through the
preliminary draft, World Bank, May, 1998.
See 'Shocks and debt', appendix in Wade and
Veneroso, op.cit.
Robert Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory
and the Role of Government in East Asian
Industrialisation (Princeton University Press, 1990),
chapters 10 and 11.
Parimal Patel and Keith Pavitt, 'Uneven and divergent
technological accumulation among advanced countries:
evidence and a framework of explanation', Industrial and
Corporate Change, Vol. 3, 1994, pp.759-87. Robert
Wade, 'Globalisation and its limits: reports of the death
of the national economy are greatly exaggerated', in
Suzanne Berger and Ronald Dore (eds.), National
Diversity and Global Capitalism, Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1996.
1990s, including the external capital account.9
Liberalisation permitted domestic agents to raise
finance on foreign markets and gave foreign agents
access to the domestic financial market. Hence
locals could open foreign bank accounts; banks
could extend credit in foreign currencies in the
domestic markets; non-bank financial institutions
and private corporations could borrow abroad; for-
eigners could own shares listed by national compa-
nies on domestic stock markets; foreign banks
could enjoy wider freedom of entry into the
domestic banking sector; and off-shore banks could
borrow abroad and lend i'° All this took
place in the context of a more or less fixed nominal
exchange rate regime, in which the domestic cur-
rency was either fixed to the US dollar or moved in
close correspondence with it.
The liberalisation of capital movements removed the
capacity for governments to coordinate foreign pri-
vate borrowing. Those who demanded financial lib-
eralisation acknowledged the need for pari passu
strengthening of bank regulation and supervision,
but did not constrain their push for liberalisation by
the pace of regulatory strengthening on the ground.
In Korea, the Kim Young Sam government of 1993
sharply accelerated the process of financial liberalisa-
tion, including, for the first time, substantially open-
ing the capital account. This was done to meet the
conditions for joining the OECD, a primary policy
goal of the Kim government. It also happened
Japan resisted the push for financial liberalisation in
developing countries. Its conflicts with the World Bank
and the IMP on this matter in the Asian context gave the
impetus to the World Bank's The East Asian Miracle
study See Wade, 'Japan, the World Bank, and the art of
paradigm maintenance: The East Asian Miracle in
political perspective', New Left Review, 217, MayJune
1996, pp.3-36.
'°Azizul Islam, 'The dynamics of Asian economic crisis
and selected policy implications', Development Research
and Policy Analysis Division, UN ESCAP, July 1998.
Ha Joon Chang, Hong Je Park, and Chu Gue Yoo,
'Interpreting the Korean crisis: financial liberalisation,
industrial policy and corporate governance', Cambridge
Journal of Economics, Vol. 22, No. 6, November 1998.
U Bank of International Settlements, 'The maturity,
sectoral and nationality distribution of international
bank lending', May 1998, Basle. Korea's figure fell from
68 per cent at end 1996 to 63 per cent at end 1997.
Indonesia's figures for the same years, 62 per cent and
61 per cent, Thailand 65 per cent and 66 per cent.
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because the big private firms had by this time high
enough credit ratings in international financial mar-
kets for them to borrow easily on their own account,
and they stopped wanting government support."
As part of the liberalisation, the government
licensed nine new merchant banks in 1994 and 15
more in July 1996, in addition to the six that existed
before the 1993 liberalisation. These inexperienced
merchant banks drove the explosive growth of
Korea's foreign debt. The debt rose from $44 billion
in 1993 to $120 billion in September 1997, most of
it private and roughly 65 per cent of it short term.'2
The design of the liberalisation programme itself
encouraged short-term foreign borrowing, because
the application procedures for short-term borrow-
ing entailed much lower transaction costs than
those for long-term borrowing.3 Moreover, the gov-
ernment allowed non-bank firms to borrow abroad
on their own account without central coordination.
About a third of Korea's total foreign debt is
accounted for by these non-bank firms. This bor-
rowing was outside the scope of bank regulation
and supervision, yet constituted foreign exchange
liabilities for the central bank.
Across Southeast Asia, too, domestic enterprises
became free to borrow abroad on their own account
with no more public supervision than in Korea. An
even higher proportion than in Korea of total for-
eign borrowing was by non-bank firms: around 60
These figures are for lending to the country by foreign
banks, where 'to the country' means to any entity in the
country, including subsidiaries of foreign firms. The
World Bank's figures on total debt and short-term debt
in Global Development Finance tend to be appreciably
different from the BIS figures. The BIS uses creditor
statistics (from the loan-extending banks), the World
Bank uses debtor statistics (from the debtor
governments). The BIS figures cover only bank lending,
the Bank also covers non-bank, specifically government
or public loans. Yet the Bank's figures are often smaller.
The differences reflect first, the poorer quality of debtor
statistics (there are many more debtors than creditors,
and debtor banks are less well supervised) and second,
differences in methodology (on such things as treatment
of subsidiaries of banks and non-banks, and the entities
whose debts are to be included in external debt - all
residents, including subsidiaries of foreign companies, or
only nationally-owned debt, including debt of foreign
subsidiaries of domestic firms).
'3Chang, Park, and Yoo, op.cit.
per cent in Malaysia and more in Indonesia.'4 All
this escaped bank regulation.
In Thailand radical financial liberalisation began in
1988 with the country's first fully civilian govern-
ment and intensified with the new civilian govern-
ment of 1992. It included opening to foreign
borrowing and the creation of a large number of
new finance companies able to compete with the
commercial banks.15 These developments gave
politicians plenty of opportunities to raise cam-
paign finance. Political competition undermined
any independent monitoring or regulation by the
central bank (see below).
In Indonesia, 'the economy's vulnerability to finan-
cial collapse can be traced to the mid-1980s, when
Indonesia opened the banking industry to competi-
tion but never put modern bank regulations in
place. "It's as if the Government had gotten rid of
the policeman at every corner, but didn't bother to
put up stop signs or lights", suggested [an econo-
mist at the University of Indonesia]. "The traffic
moved faster, but was prone to accidents."6
Liberalising the financial sector and opening the
capital account is dangerous when the banks are
inexperienced and when non-banks also borrow
abroad.'7 It is doubly dangerous in the context of a
bank-based financial system and a high debt-to-
equity corporate sector. It is triply dangerous when
the exchange rate is pegged. When, in addition, the
banks and non-banks are essentially unsupervised,
a banking-cum-currency crisis is just waiting to
happen. In Asia, swift external financial liberalisa-
tion with unsupervised banks and fixed exchange
rates undermined the previous system of industrial
"Bank for International Settlements, 'The Maturity,
Sectoral and Nationality Distribution of International
Bank Lending, First Half 1997', Basle, January 1998,
Table 1, cited in Yilmaz Akysiz, 'The East Asian financial
crisis: back to the future?', UNCTAD, processed, n.d.
(January 1998).
"In March 1993 the Bank of Thailand opened the
Bangkok International Banking Facility (BIBF), intending
to make Thailand a regional financial hub. In practice it
mostly intermediated between Thai borrowers and
foreign lenders, all in foreign currency See Ammar
Siamwalla, 'Can a developing democracy manage its
macroeconomy? The case of Thailand', paper for East
Asian Crisis Conference, Institute of Development
Studies, Sussex University, 13-14 July 1998.
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and banking cooperation and exposed fragile debt
structures to unbuffered shocks.
2.3 Inflows
The capital inflow side of the story starts with the
extraordinary growth of international capital flows
in recent years, that now amount to well over 70
times the volume of world trade. The flows are
mostly short-term; 80 per cent of net global foreign
exchange transactions have a maturity date of seven
days or less." The growth of these flows reflects, in
part, the efforts of central banks in Europe and
Japan to stimulate their economies by means of
loose monetary policy
The growth also reflects the imbalance between sav-
ings and investment in Japan. For many years the
Japanese, the fastest aging population in the world,
have been saving hard for the approaching years of
long retirement. (The average Japanese family saves
more than 13 per cent of its income, the average
American family 4 per cent.'9) The economy is
mature, among the richest in the world, and not
able productively to utilise enough investment to
absorb the savings. The result is an excess of
domestic savings over domestic investment that
manifests itself in chronic current account surpluses
matched by capital exports.2°
In the decade 1985 to 1995 the yen appreciated
hugely against the US dollar, from about 238 to 80.
East and Southeast Asian currencies, linked to the
dollar, depreciated against the yen. Real exchange
rates moved similarly At the depreciated exchange
rates East and Southeast Asia provided much more
competitive production sites. Japanese capital
'6pfl 'Experts say Indonesia can boom, long-
term', The New York Times, 22 May 1998, pAlO.
"Martin Wolf of the Financial Times has repeatedly
stressed this point. See, for example, 'Caging the
bankers', Financial Times, 20 January 1998.
"John Eatwell, 'International financial liberalisation: the
impact on world development', discussion paper, Office
of Development Studies, UNDP, nd. (1997), p.4.
"Jacob Schlesinger and David Hamilton, 'The more the
Japanese save for a rainy day, the gloomier it gets', Wall
Street Jottrnal, July 21, 1998, pAl.
"Martin Wolf, 'Saving Japan: a permanent cure',
Financial Times, April 7, 1998.
flooded out to Asia, much of it in export-oriented
production aimed at the US. Capital from other core
economies joined in. With such high rates of invest-
ment, much of it in tradeables, the economies grew
at speeds rarely equalled in human history
Thailand had about the highest growth rate in the
world in 1985-94.
Japan's imbalance between saving and investment
grew after the early 1990s because of the bursting
of the property, stock market and currency bubbles.
Japanese banks found themselves with many bad
loans. Banks near to insolvency tend to take big
risks unless they are recapitalised, merged, or
forced into bankruptcy Rather than follow one or
other of these solutions the Japanese government
decided to allow them to write off the bad loans
gradually (to 'trade through'), giving them extra
profits via a low bank rate and tax-avoiding decla-
rations of losses.2' Meanwhile the voracious
Japanese appetite for savings continued, the savings
going mostly into the banks. The banks had to lend.
The 'near to insolvency > high risks' pressure
therefore continued.
Japanese banks aggressively sought high returns
from foreign lending, much of it in risky loans to
Southeast Asia. They found themselves able to bor-
row both domestically and abroad at low rates.
They lent short term to Southeast Asian banks and
firms at appreciably higher rates, confident that
Southeast Asian currencies would remain pegged
to the US dollar. They thereby earned both an
The opprobrium now directed at the Japanese
government for not moving earlier to clean up the
banking system conceals the point that, as of 1996,
before the wider crisis, the trading-through strategy
seemed to be working tolerably well compared to the
likely alternatives. And it ignores the point that the US
government waited from 1984 to 1988 before it
devloped a comprehensive wind-up rescue plan with
public money to clean up the Savings and Loan crisis.
The US disregard of the wider impacts of its
macroeconomic policy choices (as in the Volker interest
rate hike, undertaken with no thought to its impact on
Latin America, and its reluctance to contribute to the
Bretton Woods institutions and the UN) does not
qualify it to be self-righteous about Japan choices. On
alternative methods of debt workouts see Wade and
Veneroso, op. cit.
' 'Asia and Europe: Hard talking' , The Economist, 4
April 1998, p42. The Asian countries in the
calculation include South Korea, China, Indonesia,
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interest gain and (as the yen depreciated against
the US dollar after 1995) a currency gain.
European banks also lent heavily, especially after
the flight from Mexico in the wake of the Mexican
crisis of 1994/95. By mid-1997 European banks
accounted for the largest share of the region's exter-
nal bank debt, with 39 per cent. Next came
Japanese banks, with 33 per cent.'2
On the demand side, banks and firms in Korea and
Southeast Asia rushed to borrow abroad. Borrowing
abroad at roughly half the cost of borrowing domes-
tically seemed to be a one-way bet. You could only
win. The proviso was that the currency peg to the
US dollar be maintained, precluding exchange rate
risk. (The higher credit-rated banks and enterprises
of Korea not only borrowed abroad and lent domes-
tically, they also on-lent to Southeast Asia.)
At the same time, capital flowed in to accoinmo-
date the excess of investment over savings. Gross
domestic investment was even higher than gross
domestic savings, itself about the highest in the
world at well over one-third of GDP. In short, the
inflows were driven both by the need to accommo-
date the excess of investment over savings (mani-
fested in current account deficits, see below), and
by the opportunity, thanks to capital account open-
ing, for foreign creditors to get higher returns and
domestic borrowers to borrow more cheaply They
were also driven by the image of 'miracle Asia'.
Nobody was paying much attention to the growing
imbalances in the banking systems or to other risk
Thailand, Taiwan, Malaysia, Philippines. US banks
accounted for only 8 per cent of external bank debt as
of end-June 1997. However, derivatives complicate the
picture. American banks hold a large amount of
derivatives contracts with Asian entities, probably more
than other banks. For example, J.P Morgan, which, of
the American banks, probably has the most at stake,
had $116 billion total credit risk from derivatives at
the end of 1997. A loss of one-tenth of that amount
would wipe out its equity In 1997, 90 per cent of its
non-performing loans were defaults from Asian
derivatives counterparties. Derivatives are more likely
to be defaulted on than loans, because the
counterparty 'can always say [it] didn't understand the
derivative or the bank tricked [hi or whatever', and
hence 'Companies do not view a default on derivatives
as face losing' (financial analyst with Standard and
Poohs). Bernard Baumohl, 'Asia crisis: The banks'
nuclear secrets', Time, 25 May 1998, pp.46-47, 50.
factors.23 The inflows put upward pressure on the
exchange rate. The attention of the monetary
authorities and of speculators and investors was on
the chances of preventing appreciation of the nom-
inal exchange rate. Nobody was thinking deprecia-
tion. Nobody was hedging against a currency sell
off.
2.4 Real vulnerabilities
The proximate source of real economy vulnerability
was the deterioration in the current account in all
the affected countries, especially in 1995 and 1996.
The deficits for 1996 ranged from 3.5 per cent of
GDP for Indonesia to 8 per cent for Thailand. The
most rapid increase occurred in Korea, which went
from one per cent in 1993-95 to 5 per cent in
1996.
Falling export growth was the main cause of the
rising deficits. This reflected, first, a fall in demand
for some of the main exports, notably semiconduc-
tors in the case of Korea (semiconductors being
Korea's biggest single export item). Falling export
growth reflected, second, declining competitiveness
as a result of domestic costs rising faster than pro-
ductivity Capital inflows combined with the cur-
rency peg caused appreciation of the domestic
currency The real exchange rate appreciated in all
five of the most affected countries in 1995-96,
choking exports.24
Third, the nominal exchange rate rose sharply
against the yen from spring 1995 onwards, as the
yen fell against the dollar (from a peak of 80 in
It will be interesting to read future histories of the
World Bank, the IMF and the rating agencies to see how
contrary information was kept out of their reports, and
what happened subsequently to the responsible
managers. See Marcus Brauchli, Speak no evil: why the
World Bank failed to anticipate Indonesia's deep crisis',
Wall Street Journal, 14 July 1998. (Thanks to Laura
Resnikoff for drawing it to my attention.) As an
example of the problem, the staff of the World Banks
resident mission in Indonesia prepared a speech for
President Wolfesohn to deliver during his visit in the
autumn of 1997, praising Indonesia's performance but
also containing a strong warning of serious difficulties
that needed urgent attention. Wolfensohn himself
deleted the passage, substituting an even more fulsome
endorsement of Indonesia as an Asian miracle. As
another example, the Bank's lead economist for Thailand
in 1994 wrote the (confidential) annual report on the
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1995 to 147 in June 1998). Investments that had
been competitive at the earlier exchange rate were
now less competitive, especially against Japan and
China. Much investment now looked to be 'exces-
sive'. Fourth, the terms of trade (export prices over
import prices) were trending downwards, due espe-
cially to competition from China. Fifth, China gob-
bled up export markets in the US and Japan over
the 1990s, raising its overall share of US merchan-
dise imports from 3 per cent in 1990 to 6 per cent
in 1994 and its share of Japanese merchandise
imports from 5 per cent to 10 per cent. Its share of
US footwear imports rose from 16 per cent to 45
per cent in the same years, its share of Japanese
clothing imports rose from 28 per cent to 54 per
cent.25
As investment surged throughout the region, much
of it into a narrow range of sectors, productivity and
profits began to suffer. At the margin, companies
put more and more investment into non-tradeable
speculative ventures, including property and land.
Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia all experienced
speculative property balloons inflated by foreign
finance. The borrowers received returns in local
currency and had to repay in foreign currency They
began to accumulate a massive currency mismatch.
In terms of their structural position in the world
economy the Southeast Asian economies have been
much more dependent on foreign expertise and for-
eign capital than were the East Asian economies at
the same average income level. The prospects of
their following the East Asian trajectory were always
much more uncertain. They have remained in a
economy and the Bank's strategy (the Country Assistance
Strategy), and warned of major problems associated with
the build up of foreign debt. His division chief removed
most of the bad news. The division chief was promoted,
the lead economist left the division. Neither Wolfensohn
nor the division chief had independent empirical
grounds for reversing the judgment of their
subordinates. 'We were caught up in the enthusiasm of
Indonesia', said Wolfesnsohn to critics in Jakarta in early
1998 - with disingenuousness in the we'.
Raphael Kaplinsky, "If you want to get somewhere
else, you must run at least twice as fast as that!': The
roots of the East Asian crisis', paper for East Asian
conference, Institute of Development Studies, Sussex
University, 13-14 July 1998 (edited version in this
volume).
'Kaplinsky, ibid.
subcontractor role. They have seriously
underinvested in education, resulting in secondary
school enrollments in Thailand and Indonesia half
or less than half those of Korea and Taiwan at the
same per capita income level. They suffer serious
infrastructure congestion. These endowment prob-.
lems, combined with Chinese competition from
below and Korean, Taiwanese, Japanese and
European competition from above, have pinned
them in a medium technology trap.
The advent of democratically elected civilian
governments in Thailand and Korea added to their
vulnerabilities. In Thailand this began in the late
1980s with the first democratically elected govern-
ment, and intensified under the next civilian gov-
ernment of 1992.26 These governments began to
undermine the previously high level of autonomy
and competence of the economic technocracy Their
constituency lay predominantly in rural areas well
away from Bangkok. Candidates who purchased
votes to win parliamentary elections ran up huge
obligations. The successful candidates, eyes on their
war-chests, set about capturing income and power
in the state bureaucracy The first civilian govern-
ment was popularly known as 'the buffet cabinet'in
tribute to its appetite for money 'To them, and more
importantly, to their constituents, the public trea-
sury is a milchcow, and the MPs' central chore is to
milk that cow and bring the milk back home to
their constituents' 27 The finance ministry and the
central bank, whose independence and technocratic
excellence had helped previous military govern-
ments maintain macroeconomic stability, came
under their sway Political appointees went into
senior positions and corrupted decisions about
economic policy
In Korea, the first democratically elected civilian
government, under President Kim Young Sam,
came to power in 1993 committed to far-reaching
liberalisation. It abolished the investment
The first government was headed by Chartchai
Choonawan and lasted from 1988 to 1991. After a
military interlude the second civilian government was
headed by Chuan Leekpai from 1992 to 1995.
'Ammar Siamwalla, Can a developing democracy
manage its macroeconomy? The case of Thailand',
op.cit. See also Richard Doner and Ansil Ramsay,
'Thailand; from economic miracle to economic crisis',
unpublished paper, Political Science Department, Emory
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coordination superministry (the Economic
Planning Board), folding it into the Ministry of
Finance. At the same time it allowed some of the
chaebol to become closer to, more personalistically
involved with the regime than had its military
predecessors since the beginning of the 1960s.
Problems were also building up in Korea's corporate
sector. A series of bankruptcies occurred in 1997,
which contributed to the November 1997 crash.28
The bankruptcies were concentrated in the middle-
ranking, rather than among the biggest, chaebol.
The middle-ranking ones had, over the 1990s, bor-
rowed the most, relative to their equity, in order to
grow and diversify as fast as possible, seeking to
catch up with the leaders. They were able to borrow
so much because company accounting practices
allowed them to cross-guarantee the debts of one
affiliate with promises from other affiliates, instead
of presenting stand-alone business investment pro-
jects independently collateralised. The practice of
cross-guarantees between the affiliates of a chaebol
exposed the whole conglomerate to the default of
one of the components. The middle-ranking chae-
bol were also allowed to borrow so much because
they bribed the relevant bankers and politicians,
and because international banks based in Japan,
Europe and the US practically begged them to take
the money
The bankruptcies in Korea revealed serious short-
comings in several institutions, including irregular
supervision of the banks, feeble supervision of com-
pany accounting practices, and growing dishonesty
among public officials. Above all, they illustrated
how the chaebol dominate the economy, marginal-
ising small and medium enterprises and robbing
Korea of an equivalent to Taiwan's swarms of small,
nimble, niche-seeking firms. Indeed, some of the
IMF's conditions on such matters as corporate gov-
ernance - matters that seemed a long way from the
solutions to the immediate crisis - were inserted
University, January 1998. Donald Emmerson, 'Economic
rupture as political rorschach; paradigmatic aspects of
the East Asian crisis', unpublished, Political Science
Department, University of Wisconsin, Madison, March
1998.
"John Mathews, 'Fashioning a new Korean model Out of
the crisis', Cambridge Journal of Econmics Vol. 22, No.
6, November 1998.
with the encouragement of Korean Ministry of
Finance officials, who saw the crisis as a golden
opportunity to force through structural changes
which they had long wanted, but which had been
blocked in the Korean political process.09
Over and above the condition of each country was
the fact that they were fairly highly integrated
(roughly half of total trade was intraregiorial) and
moving cyclically rather than countercyclically. Had
they been less integrated or less synchronised, the
regional multiplier effects would have been much
smaller. (Taiwan has survived relatively unscathed
partly because its boom and bust had taken place in
the early 1990s. By the time this crisis hit the region
Taiwan's banks were in relatively good shape.30)
The third vital element in the regional picture, after
integration and cyclicality, was the stagnation of
Japan, that accounts for two-thirds of the East and
Southeast Asian economy
In short, the vulnerability of the real economy in
Asia did increase in the few years before the crisis.
Price and investment trends led to growing current
account deficits. Also, at least in Thailand and
Korea, new civilian democratic regimes corrupted
the central policymaking technocracy and lost focus
on national economic policies. Government
bank--firm collaboration came to be steered more
by the narrow and short-term interests of shifting
coalitions. Their experience is bad news for the
proposition that more competitive politics yield
better policies.
2.5 Outflows
Granted that the whipsaw movement of capital
inflows and outflows is the main proximate cause of
the crisis, could it have happened without serious
vulnerabilities in the real economy? Almost cer-
tainly, yes. We know from history that financial
crises can occur in the absence of ex ante signs of
rising vulnerability (though any self-respecting ana-
lyst can find vulnerabilities ex post). Indeed, when
29 Mathews, op.cit., based on interviews with Korean
officials in January 1998.
'°Wade and Veneroso, op.cit., pli.
39Jan Kregel, 'Yes, "it" did happen again - a Minsky crisis
happened in Asia', March 1998, unpublished, Jerome
Levy Institute, New York.
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times are good and demand is fast growing, firms
tend to assign increased weight to past positive
experience and reduce the probability of loss asso-
ciated with some of their investment projects. They
may cut back their cushion of safety (probable cash-
flow minus probable fixed payments) and thereby
become more vulnerable to a downturn.3' This is
how, paradoxically, the passage from a sound, to a
fragile, to an unstable financial system can occur
even faster after a period of good times than after a
period of uncertain times.
Also, we know that bankers and money managers
tend to exhibit herd-like behaviour based on the
incentive that any individual banker or individual
bank will be faulted by management or sharehold-
ers for missing out on business that others are get-
ting, but will not be faulted for making losses when
everyone else is making losses. The effect is com-
pounded by information cascade, such that the
entry (exit) of one prominent actor is interpreted
by other actors to signal that the situation is better
(worse) than they thought. They then enter or exit
for reasons related not to their own independent
assessment of risk and reward, but to their pre-
sumption that the first actor knows something they
do not,32
The fall in export growth and rising current account
deficits by 1995/1996 made for mild concern
among international banks and money managers,
especially regarding Thailand. But doubts were held
at bay by the continuing fast growth and the image
of miracle Asia. Then the outlook for speculators
and investors in the European and US markets
improved in 1997. Interest rates looked set to rise,
presenting lenders with opportunities for higher
risk-adjusted returns than they had had before.
Equity markets soared.33 In Japan, on the other
hand, the outlook turned for the worse in the sec-
ond quarter of 1997. In early May 1997, Japanese
officials, concerned about the decline of the yen,
hinted that they might raise interest rates. The
Suchil Bikhchandani, David Hirschleifer and Ivo
Welch, 'Learning from the behavior of others:
conformity, fads, and informational cascades', Journal of
Economic Perspectives, Vol. 12, No. 3, 1998, 15 1-70.
' Chris Rude, 'The 1997-98 East Asian financial crisis: a
New York market-informed view', Department of
Economic and Social Affairs, UN, July 1998.
threat never materialised. But the combination of
the threat of a rise in Japanese interest rates in order
to defend the yen, plus the worries that were circu-
lating about Thailand's currency, plus the brighter
opportunities in the US and Europe, raised fears
among commercial bankers, investment bankers,
and others about the safety of big investment posi-
tions throughout the region that were predicated on
currency stability
The Asia crisis proper began as a huge liquidity cri-
sis in Thailand. First, the Thai property and stock
market bubbles burst in 1995 and 1996, respec-
tively The property market is a market where small
withdrawals can have a big effect on prices and
leave the banking system in the sort of danger that
makes depositors withdraw their money The prop-
erty market crash ripped through the whole finan-
cial sector and on into the foreign exchange market
as foreign investors saw that a devaluation would
render domestic borrowers less able to meet the
now more expensive debt service charges on their
short-term foreign loans. With a baht devaluation in
sight (a breaking of the peg), companies in
Thailand, both foreign and domestic, tried to sell
their baht for dollars. Foreign banks realised they
had large short-term foreign exchange loans to Thai
borrowers that were unhedged and perhaps uncov-
ered by Thai reserves. Knowing that the profitabil-
ity of their loans depended on the currency peg,
they raced for the exits at the first signs that the peg
might not hold. There were runs on the baht in
mid-1996 and again in early 1997. The Thai
Central Bank bought baht to prevent the price fall,
but eventually gave up as reserves fell to danger-
ously low levels. It also resorted secretly to bor-
rowing abroad and including the borrowed funds in
its officially declared reserves.34
With reserves running out, the baht was floated in
early July 1997, and sank. The IMF entered
Thailand in August 1997 with a support package
and conditionality measures that included the freez-
ing of many finance companies. This was the start
of what Jeffrey Sachs has called the IMFs scream-
ing fire in the theatre.35 The freezing of finance
For more on the chronology of the crisis, see Wade,
'The Asian debt-and-development crisis of 1997-?',
opcit.
55Jeffrey Sachs, 'The IMF and the Asian flu', The
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companies sent uninsured depositors into a panic.
Later the IMF imposed the closure of some domes-
tic banks in Indonesia with the same result
(inevitable where deposits are uninsured).
Taiwan's small (12 per cent) devaluation in October,
despite its towering foreign exchange reserves, acted
as a firebridge from Southeast to East Asia. After
Taiwan's unexpected devaluation the Hong Kong dol-
lar and the Korean won suddenly looked set for a
catch-up devaluation. As holders of these currencies,
too, tried to pull out the crisis grew from a 'Southeast
Asian' crisis to an 'Asian crisis'. In October to
December Japanese, US and European bankers
demanded full repayment of interest and principal
from their Korean borrowers as short-term loans
came due, and the Korean government had no option
but to turn to the IMP The IMF and the Korean gov-
ernment signed a $57 billion rescue package in early
December. In mid-December the Koreans revealed
that their short-term debt was nearly double what
they had claimed only the week before, in other
words, $95 billion. The gap between $95 billion and
$57 billion left scarcely a dry pair of pants in the offi-
cial community on either side of the Pacific.
A very big rescue package at this point could have
stopped the crisis from spreading. Better informa-
tion about bank and corporate balance sheets might
also have checked the panic by enabling investors
to discriminate between good and bad assets.
Instead, the perception shifted from 'miracle Asia' to
'Asian crony state capitalism' almost overnight.
'Crony capitalism', originally coined by activists in
the anti-Marcos struggle in the Philippines, was
now appropriated to convey a told-you-so moral
about the dangers of government intervention.36
2.6 Debt deflation and import inflation
Once floated, the currencies fell in vicious iteration
with domestic bankruptcies (which no amount of
developmental state socialising of risk could avoid).
As foreign banks that had been routinely rolling
over their short-term loans began to demand repay-
ment of not only the interest but also the whole of
the principal, highly leveraged firms found their
American Prospect, MarchApril, 1998, pp.l6-2l.
36Donald Emmerson, personal communication, 2 May
1998.
cashflow insufficient to cover their now much
higher payment obligations. They started to reduce
their cash outflows by delaying payments to suppli-
ers, cutting back on expenditures, raising cash by
selling inventories at cut-rate prices, selling assets at
whatever they could fetch, and firing employees. In
Korea and Southeast Asia the proportion of techni-
cally insolvent large companies (unable to pay
interest charges out of net cashflow) was expected
to jump between 1997 and 1998 from 21 per cent
to 32 per cent in Korea; from 11 per cent to 19 per
cent in Malaysia; 16 per cent to 46 per cent in
Indonesia; 11 per cent to 18 per cent in the
Philippines.37 The calculations date from February
1998. More recent ones would show higher figures
for 1998. The tragedy is that many of these insol-
vent companies were well managed and profitable
in competitive markets. The process fed through
from firms to banks as banks wrote off loans and
wrote down assets. Their calling in of loans put
pressure on their borrowers, and those that go
bankrupt put pressure on their depositors. The
financial economy and the real economy dragged
each other down.
This is debt deflation', akin to the Great Depression
of the 1930s.38 Debt deflation is a downward pres-
sure on prices of both products and of assets at a
time when investment demand is falling, resulting
in a rising real value of debt. It is given a vicious
twist in Asia by the steep rise in the price of
imports, including intermediate goods and medi-
cines. Asia is now caught in the slow, painful
unfolding of debt deflation with import inflation. It
is all the worse because of Asia high debtlequity
ratios, that impart a bigger multiplier effect to a
given reduction in demand and cashflow. This is
37A comparable calculation for Thailand, for 1996 and
third quarter 1997, gives a jump from 12 per cent to 36
per cent. The figures are to be taken as no more than
rough approximations. They are based on Goldman
Sachs, Asset Quality for Korean Banks, Part II, Bottom-
Up Approach for Estimating NPLs, 19 February 1998,
William Mako, Thai Corporates: Origins of Financial
Distress and Measures to Promote Voluntary
Restructuring, as elaborated by Michael Pomerleano,
'The East Asia crisis and corporate finances: a micro
story', preliminary draft, World Bank, May 1998.
38Jan Kregel, op.cit., Wade and Veneroso, op.cit., Wade
1998, op.cit.
' The Fund conditions in Asia are open to the same
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ho in the chaos theory metaphor, the butterfly
that flapped its wings in Thailand caused a
hurricane across Asia.
2.7 The IMF's role
The IMF's interventions in Thailand, Indonesia and
Korea (and informally, without funding, in
Malaysia) have made things worse than need be,
according to this story Misdiagnosing the problem
as a macroeconomic balance-of-payments problem
(the type of problem it is used to dealing with)
rather than as a microeconomic debt deflation
problem, and as a crisis of excess consumption
rather than excess investment, the IMF insisted on
a domestic austerity package and on fundamental
structural reforms in return for bail-out funds.39 It
justified big increases in real interest rates on the
grounds that high rates would be an incentive for
domestic capital to stay at home and foreign lenders
to resume lending, which would boost the currency
The currency boost would both make it easier for
domestic firms to repay their foreign debts and
check the dangers of competitive, 1930s-style
devaluations. It insisted upon far-reaching struc-
tural reforms, because, as First Deputy Managing
Director of the IMF Stanley Fischer says, 'The faster
[the underlying structural problems in the financial
and corporate sectors are dealt with], the shorter
the period of pain, and the sooner the return to
growth' .0
This was the theory In practice the increase in real
interest rates combined with other elements of the
austerity package (tax increases, cuts in govern-
ment expenditure) only depressed firms' cashflow
and raised their fixed payment obligations, tipping
critique as Mark Blaug makes of economists' advice
about the transition problem in Eastern Europe: 'We
have not been very good at thinking about the transitïon
problem in Eastern Europe because we have not been
thinking about how market economies actually work
and what is required to make markets function. So our
advice to Eastern Europe has been very wooden. - -
Mark Blaug, 'The state of modern economics: the
problems with formalism', interview, Challenge,
MayJune 1998, pp.35-45, at p.43.
Stanley Fischer, 'Year of upheaval: the IMF was right
on high interest rates and immediate restructuring',
Asiaweek, 17 July 1998. Compare in the same issue,
Joseph Stiglitz, 'Road to recovery: restoring growth in
the region could be a long and difficult process'.
more and more into insolvency, accelerating the
outflows and reducing the inflows. In prioritising
the return of capital flows the Fund forgot that pri-
vate capital flows are cyclical rather than counter-
cyclical. When a whole economy is sinking and
instability abounds foreign capital will not return,
whatever the interest rate. Certainly the high real
interest rates did not have the effect of reversing
the currency falls in Asia. And the cross-country
evidence shows no clear relationship between the
level of real interest rates and changes in the
exchange rate.1
A sharp dose of austerity may make sense for a
Latin American-style excessive consumption cri-
sis. But the Asian crisis was related to excessive
investment (much of it in non-tradeables), not
excessive consumption. IMF demand compression
worsens already existing problems of excessive
capacity Similarly being required to undertake
fundamental structural reforms at the height of the
crisis worsened confidence, reinforcing the 'crony-
ism-failure' gestalt. Requiring a sharp rise in bank-
capital-adequacy standards in the midst of the
crisis caused a cut in credit, a rise in non-per-
forming loans, and further bankruptcies. The
Asian experience confirms that the middle of a liq-
uidity crisis is a bad time to make radical financial
reforms.
The Fund also required the governments to
guarantee the foreign debts of local firms and
banks. Protected from default, foreign creditors
hung back on rescheduling or rolling over the debt.
This worsened the hard currency squeeze on local
debtors, pushing them to buy foreign exchange to
cover their increased dollar needs and adding to the
exchange rate collapse.
These various policy mistakes help to explain why
the crisis has been so protracted. Their effects are
compounded by the high debtlequity ratios of the
corporate and financial systems, by the relatively
high level of regional integration, the synchronous
See Joseph Stiglitz, 'Knowledge for development:
economic science, economic policy, and economic
advice', Annual Bank Conference on Development
Economics, World Bank, Washington D.C., April 1998.
' The Fund has endorsed some relaxation. lt is not clear
how much the Fund had a change of mind and how
much it is making the best of fait accomplis. See Wade,
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movement of all the regional economies except
Taiwan, and by Japan's stagnation. Mexico in 1994
recovered relatively quickly by exporting to the
giant to the north, whose political structure was suf-
ficiently institutionalised to accommodate a $20
billion swing in trade balances in one year. Had
Japan been expanding it might have played a simi-
lar role as the US to Mexico. Fears of further falls in
the Japanese yen (even after the steep fall of June
1998 to 147 yen to the US dollar) add to the con-
tinuing reluctance to invest and raise fears of com-
petitive devaluations, notably in China and Hong
Kong.
3 The Future
As of July 1998 governments of the region are
beginning to follow an expansionary policy, lower-
ing real interest rates, expanding the monetary base,
and running bigger fiscal deficits. This represents a
considerable change of direction.42 lt sets aside the
central bank orthodoxy that has dominated the dis-
cussion, according to which very low inflation,
restrained demand, and high real interest rates are
the top priorities. Governments now have to chan-
nel credit into export industries, generate an export
boom taking advantage of exchange rates, and let
the profits therefrom reinforce inflationary expecta-
tions in reflating domestic demand. Hopefully
inventory depletion will be followed by a bounce-
back in demand.
Governments may have to reintroduce some form
of cross-border capital controls for this strategy to
be viable. Indeed, it is not obvious why Asia needs
to draw capital from the rest of the world (except in
the form of FDI, a small proportion of the total). Its
savings are more than enough to support the vol-
ume of investment that is productive and profitable
without being speculative. Of course, the reintro-
duction of some forms of capital controls in Asia
would be a major setback in the current Big Push
for liberalisation of capital movements worldwide,
and would be fiercely resisted by Western financial
'Asian water torture', Financial Times, 23 June 1998,
Wanda Tseng (Acting Director, Asia and Pacific
Department, IMF), 'Near-zero interest rates are no
panacea for Asia', letters, Financial Times, 6 July 1998,
Wade, 'IMF and US Treasury playing catch up on Asia
strategy', letters, Financial Times, 14 July 1998.
interests.' If capital controls are not reestablished
the exchange rate must float. The Asia crisis shows
only too clearly the dangers of free capital
movements and fixed rates.
The escape from crisis could be much accelerated
through regional cooperation between the govern-
ments and their central banks. The lack of deliber-
ately concerted regional expansion is one of the
most striking features of the whole story The region
has the means to solve the crisis if only it could put
them to work: some $700 billion of foreign
exchange reserves between China, Hong Kong,
Taiwan and Japan, growing current account sur-
pluses in the crisis-affected countries (even if due
more to import compression than export expan-
sion), net creditor positions in terms of foreign asset
ownership, and huge savings. The magnitude of the
neighbourhood contagion effect gives each country
an incentive not to free-ride.
These endowments could easily provide the basis
for an Asia Fund. The Fund would help member
countries replenish reserves as soon as signs of dis-
tress become obvious, thereby reducing the chance
of investor pullout. It would be designed to be
quick disbursing and lightly conditional. Even the
first moves towards an Asia Fund might trigger a
shift of image from 'failure' to 'recovery' and send
Western capital racing to take positions before
prices rise especially if Western stock markets fall
from current valuations that are, in the US case,
twice the previous historic highs.44
"See Wade and Veneroso, op.cit., Wade, 'The Asian
debt-and-development crisis of 1997?', op.cit. Chris
Rude, 'The 1997-98 East Asian financial crisis', op.cit.,
emphasises the ambiguity in the minds of Wall Street
money managers about what to do. Wearing their
'market professional' hat they are sympathetic to the idea
of various forms of capital controls, temporary or
otherwise, because they see - not just in the Asian crisis
- that international financial markets can be severely
dysfunctional. Wearing their 'businessman' hat, however,
they want total freedom and national treatment. This
suggests that a serious push for a more regulated
international monetary system, complete with potential
for capital controls, might not he as strongly opposed
from Wall Street as is generally thought.
The record-breaking rise in American stocks has been
propelled partly by capital coming out of Asia. See
Jonathan Fuerbringer, 'Markets are bolstered as investors
flee rout in Asia', New York Times, 14 May 1998.
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The main obstacle is political. Japan's proposal for
an Asia Fund, made in mid-1997, was shot down
by the US Treasury which wanted any such thing to
be within the IMP Japan has since exercised negli-
gible leadership, and remains paralysed by the
power struggle between big manufacturing wanting
a weak yen, and banks wanting a strong yen. China
has shown a moderate amount of leadership, and
emerges from the crisis with its reputation
enhanced relative to Japan's. But it is the US
Treasury under Secretary Rubin and Under
Secretary Summers that has been shaping the over-
all strategy, both directly and indirectly via the
IMP.45 The US emerges from the crisis with much
greater power in the region than it had before. And
the US does not want an Asian initiative that would
exclude it from a central role.'6 Nor does China
want a Japanese-led fund.
Until Asian governments - very much including the
Japanese government - adopt expansionary poli-
cies, take control of short-term capital movements,
and cooperate within the region, the crisis is likely
to drag on and on, like water torture, bringing
poverty and insecurity to hundreds of millions of
people and turning parts of Asia into a dependency
of the IMF and its number one shareholder.
4 Conclusion
'Real' or 'financial' causes? Rational behaviour,
boundedly rational, or non-rational? Individually
rational, collectively non-rational, socially subopti-
mal? Specific and exceptional market failure or
"Jacob Weisberg, 'Keeping the boom from busting', The
New York Times Magazine, 19 July 1998, p.24 ff. Also
Wade and Veneroso, op.cit; Wade, 'The Asian debt-and-
development crisis'. Note that the State Department,
Commerce Department, National Economic Council,
National Security Council and CIA have had virtually no
role; Treasury has called all the shots.
'° the Hong Kong Annual Meeting of the Fund and
the World Bank ïn late September/early October 1997
Eisuke Sakakibara, Japanese vice-minister of finance for
international affairs, called a meeting of senior Asian
finance officials without informing the Americans. When
word reached Treasury Under Secretary Summers, he left
his meeting, entered the room where the Asian officials
were gathered, sat down at the table and said, 'Now
where were we?'. From a source who requests
anonymity.
well-working markets producing massive
economic, political and social failures (as in 'The
operation was a success but the patient died') ?
The capital inflows were a function of capital
account opening, fixed exchange rates, bank super-
vïsion inadequate for an internationalised system,
depreciation of domestic currencies against the yen
(because linked to the falling dollar), and higher
returns to financial assets in Asia than in the US and
Europe. The outflows were a function of capital
account opening, appreciation of domestic curren-
cies against the yen after spring 1995 (because
linked to rising dollar), falling export growth and
rising current account deficits, the combination of
the last two giving rise to fears of devaluation.
The causation also has another strand relating to
herding behaviour, information cascades and the
like, that links individual rationality with collective
non-rationality or suboptimality What is striking
about the Asia crisis is the abrupt shift of confi-
dence from 'miracle Asia' to 'crony Asia' - a 'gestalt
shift' in the language of cognitive psychology. In the
famous drawing of a vase or a pair of inturned faces
we see either one or the other, not some of one and
some of the other, and the shift takes place instan-
taneously, not by degrees. This is a long way from
the idea of rational, weighting-up risks and rewards
calculation.
The notion of gestalt shift lends support to the
'panic' story - that the crisis was caused in large part
by speculator and investor pullout from economies
that, but for the pullout, would have remained
viable enough to generate returns within the normal
range. The panic, in other words, was not simply
the 'trigger' or messenger of a crisis. The panic was
a primary cause. The change in behaviour was
much bigger than the changes in 'real' factors could
warrant.
This line of argument suggests that had the massive
outflow not occurred in Thailand, or had it been
reversed in a matter of a couple of months, the Asia
crisis would not have happened. One can see sev-
eral turning points where things might have gone
differently The inflows would have been less large
had the countries not opened up the capital account
earlier in the 1990s. The Japanese economy might
still have been expanding had the Japanese govern-
ment not made the colossal macro error in the
spring of 1997 of raising taxes as the economy was
slowing. Had the Japanese government in August
1997 matched its pledge to play a big role in pro-
moting financial stability in the region with a con-
tribution to the Thai bail-out of $10 billion rather
than $4 billion, confidence might have been
restored. Ditto had the US Treasury not shot down
Japan's Asia Fund proposal of August 1997. Ditto
had the US Congress not declined to provide more
funds to the IMF in November 1997 because of a
dispute about an abortion-related amendment to
the country's foreign aid programme. It took an
unlikely conjuncture of these and several other
events that might easily have been different to pro-
duce a crisis on anything like this scale. In this
sense the crisis was under-determined. This is to
make the contrast with interpretations that stress
major vulnerabilities in the real economy as the
causes, according to which the crisis was over-
determined - a major crisis was bound to happen
and any of many events could have triggered it. The
real economy trends, notably falling export growth
and widening current account deficits, were
amplifiers, not prime causes.47
China stands as a case in point. It has many charac-
teristics of the crisis countries, pre-crisis, only more
so: great dynamism and huge structural problems.
Its banking system is in worse shape than Thailand's
or Korea's before the crisis. Its escape from a direct
hit reflects its closed capital account, implicit gov-
ernment guarantee of deposits, and big foreign
exchange reserves. This same line of argument
throws doubt on the popular moral hazard argu-
ment for why the inflows were so big. The moral
hazard argument says that lenders lent appreciably
more than otherwise because they believed they
would be covered by implicit government or IMF
guarantees. But the hypothesis is advanced without
evidence that, for example, lenders lent more to
companies, banks, sectors and countries where
there was a stronger ex ante presumption of bail-
out. It is equally plausible that lenders were paying
no attention to downside risks, being carried along
The analytical challenge is to marry the contingent world economy to generate credit balloons and crashes
nature of the Asian crisis with the propensity of the that rotate from place to place.
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by the gestalt of miracle Asia and the incentives for
herd behaviour. (Life insurance policies are not nor-
mally blamed for suicides.)
Much the same point applies to the popular 'lack of
transparency' hypothesis about the size of the
inflows: that lenders lent more than they would
have had they been better informed about balance
sheets, foreign exchange reserves and foreign debts.
In fact, plenty of relevant information was publicly
available; for example, the Bank for International
Settlements' commentaries from early 1995
onwards stressed the build up of short-term foreign
debt.48 But investors were not reading - until after
the crisis hit, at which point they refocused from
macro indicators towards the micro indicators of
debt maturity structures and the like that they
could have been tracking all the while, had they a
mind to. On the other hand, lack of transparency
may have a significant role in explaining the magni-
tude of the panic, and hence the size of the out-
flows, for the reason given earlier.
The IMF argues that its far-reaching conditions for
austerity and institutional reform boosted confi-
dence as investors saw the governments táking firm
action to repair the underlying vulnerabilities. The
gestalt shift argument says, in contrast, that the
news that a country was negotiating conditionalities
with the IMF aggravated the loss of confidence,
prompting a bigger rush for the exits; as did the sig-
nal that far-reaching institutional reforms were
essential for growth to be restored.
The latter argument raises an interesting question of
causality IMF critics have pointed out that no size-
able changes occurred in indicators of national
institutional strength in the last year or two before
the crisis, and go on to ask how, given this, institu-
tional factors could be assigned a large role. (For
example, the ratio of short-term to total debt had
been constant since 1993, and not so much above
the rising Latin American average.) But weaknesses
such as lack of bankruptcy codes and creditor rights
may exist for years without causing difficulties, pro-
vided growth remains high. Once growth falters
these same constant weaknesses may help to bring
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on a crisis and hinder the resumption of growth.
The question remains, however, whether the Fund
should have insisted on such reforms in the middle
of a liquidity crisis.
However the explanation is parsed, capital account
opening is central. lt exposed domestic financial
structures - that had been strong enough to allocate
huge domestic savings to generally productive and
profitable investments over many years - to unbear-
able strain.49 Yet the IMF and the US and UK
Treasuries now insist that the crisis demonstrates
the importance of liberalising the capital account
even more - though in an 'orderly' way Orderly
means with a proper regulatory and supervisory
regime in place. The way to create that regime, they
say, is to bring in foreign banks and financial ser-
vices firms to operate in the domestic market. They
will demand an effective regime and help to supply
the skills with which to operate it. In return, they
will require freedom to enter and exit as they wish,
and national treatment (parity with domestic firms,
or better).
Even with a sizeable sector of foreign financial
firms, developing an effective regime will take many
years. And duration aside, regulation according to
whose norms? The norms of a capital-market-based
Anglo-American system are very different to those
of a bank-based Asian system. The latter reflect the
functioning of a system that allows firms to carry
much higher levels of debt than consistent with
Anglo-American prudential limits. The system has
powerful developmental advantages as well as
higher risks of financial instability And it also seems
to be a response to very high levels of household
savings that are deposited in banks. A regulatory
regime based on Anglo-American norms of prudent
debt/equity ratios will probably not work in these
conditions.
The idea that the way to avoid more Asian-style
crises is to integrate national economies even more
fully into world capital markets is implausible. As
Dani Rodrik remarks, 'Thailand and Indonesia
would have been far better off restricting borrowing
from abroad instead of encouraging it. Korea might
18 'The Maturity, Sectoral and Nationality Distribution of See Governing the Market, p.367, for the stability
International Bank Lending, First Half 1995 ',Januaiy conditions of the bank-based high debt model.
1996, Basle, p.5; and 66th Annual Report, 10 June 1996,
Basle, p.141.
just have avoided a run on its reserves if controls on
short-term borrowing had kept its short-term expo-
sure to foreign banks, say, at 30 per cent rather than
70 per cent of its liabilities. On the other hand,
which of the recent blowups in international finan-
cial markets could the absence of capital controls
conceivably have prevented?'50 There is little empir-
ical evidence that capital account opening improves
economic performance.5'
The greatest concern about capital account convert-
ibility, however, is that it brings economic policy in
developing countries even more under the influ-
ence of international capital markets - the influence
of a small number of country analysts and fund
managers in New York, London, Frankfurt, and
Tokyo. Even if it were the case that free capital
movements do lead to efficiency in the allocation of
capital and as such do maximise the returns to cap-
ital world wide, governments have much more than
the interests of the owners of capital in view - or
ought to have. They want to maximise the returns
to labor, to entrepreneurship, to technical progress,
and to maximise them within their own territory
rather than somewhere else; they want to provide
public goods that contribute to the good life. Only
blind faith in the virtues of capital markets could
"Dani Rodrik, 'Who needs capital account
convertibility?', paper to be included in a publication of
the International Finance Section, Princeton University,
Harvard University, February 1998. Also Jagdish
Bhagwati, 'The capital myth: the difference between
trade in widgets and dollars', Foreign Affairs, May 1998.
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lead one to think that maximising the returns to
capital and promoting development goals generally
coincide 52
The crisis shows that the IMF must be redesigned.
lt demonstrated an overriding commitment to two
goals - to protect the virtue of free capital markets
by pinning the blame on 'homegrown' causes, and
to ensure the repayment of the creditors. The
actions it took in pursuance of these goals almost
certainly made the crisis worse. It needs a constitu-
tional change to give the interests of borrowers
more weight.
Finally, we should insist on a linguistic convention.
'Investor' should be used only for someone who
allows his money to be used for the production of
goods and services in return for a share in the pro-
ceeds, including the purchase of new shares.
Someone who buys financial assets in secondary
markets in the expectation of subsequently selling
them at a profit, due to exchange rate shifts or asset
price shifts related not to dividend flows but to the
number of buyers and sellers, is properly called a
'speculator'. The distinction helps to avoid assum-
ing that what is good for speculation is also good
for investment.
sr See Stiglitz, op.cit, Rodrik, op.cit., Bhagwati, op.cit.
For evidence favourable to capital account opening, see
Dennis Quinn, 'The correlates of international financial
deregulation', American Political Science Review, Vol. 91,
September 1997, pp.531-51.
50A point made by Rodrik, op.cit.
